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This book gathers twelve fascinating stories about the history of knowledge 
in postwar Scandinavia. It presents us with a broad range of source materials, 
questions, and focal points, from government information on nuclear fallout 
to left-wing oppositional book cafés. In this epilogue, I reflect upon the find-
ings of the book from the perspective of an intellectual historian of 20th-
century Norden.1 I start by making some general outsider reflections on the 
emerging field of the history of knowledge, before discussing what the book 
contributes with regarding the role of Scandinavia in the global circulation of 
knowledge, the relations between the Scandinavian countries, and knowledge 
in the welfare state and the particular period in focus in this book, the 1960s 
and 1970s.
As an intellectual historian, there is undoubtedly much I can symphatize with 
in the history of knowledge. Crucial is the focus on the historiocity and chang-
ing nature of knowledge, on the transformations and interpretations of knowl-
edge when it travels from one context to another, and on questions regarding 
social and cultural authority. Trained as a philosopher, however, I cannot help 
that my initial reflex when confronted with the term “history of knowledge” 
is that of a slight concern with the unnecessary epistemological commitment 
that seems to follow from professing to study “knowledge” rather than “ideas”. 
The theoretical literature on the history of knowledge has pursued this issue in 
a variety of ways, ranging from Philipp Sarasin’s and Simone Lässig’s emphasis 
on rationality, reason, and evidence to Peter Burke’s more pragmatic approach, 
according to which historians of knowledge study whatever the historical 
actors themselves considered knowledge.2 Only a few chapters in the book at 
hand dwell on these kinds of theoretical reflections. Bo Fritzbøger is one of 
the exceptions and seems to adopt a position close to Burke when stating that 
the history of knowledge studies “claims to knowledge”. To me, this sounds 
reasonable when it comes to issues such as environmentalism, sex education, 
or secularisation – to mention a few of the issues covered in the book – but 
it remains awkwardly applicable on plainly, ostensibly, and thoroughly political 
ideas such as neoliberalism or Eurocommunism. What new does history of 
knowledge bring to our understanding of these phenomena as compared to 
traditional histories of ideas or intellectual/political history?
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One of the main differences between intellectual history and the history of 
knowledge, in my view, lies in the ambition of the latter to target actors and 
source materials beyond the political and intellectual elites. From the perspec-
tive of intellectual history, the question of influence remains one of a number of 
notoriously tricky questions. Without concrete evidence in the form of explicit 
references, it is nearly impossible to claim with any professed certainty that 
one intellectual inspired or influenced another, let alone claim that a particu-
lar philosophy or ism has shaped the direction of society at large. Intellectual 
historians have developed a repertoire of theoretical smokescreens to dodge 
this question.3 History of knowledge, by contrast, seems to put the question of 
influence at the centre of attention. In this book, most of the chapters set out to 
explore the circulation of some particular “knowledge”, whether in the form of 
a book, an author, or a set of ideas. While this strikes to me as a rather perilous 
venture, there are some inspiring and interesting developments to learn from.
Particularly promising in relation to this is the rediscovered focus on materi-
ality, highlighted in the theoretical literature on the history of knowledge, and 
demonstrated by several of the individual chapters in this volume. If traditional 
intellectual history sometimes risks relying a bit too heavily on the driving 
force of the ideas themselves, the history of knowledge insists that material, 
physical, and social conditions are crucial if we want to understand the circula-
tion of ideas. This means that the history of knowledge, to a higher degree than 
intellectual history, must include a cross-disciplinary element, linking together 
different fields such as intellectual history, book history, media history, eco-
nomic history, social history, or the history of social movements. While this 
might risk the history of knowledge turning into a rather unfocused venture, it 
can also be seen as a strength. Indeed, as pointed out by my fellow intellectual 
historian Suzanne Marchand, perhaps the point of pursuing research under a 
new heading such as “history of knowledge” is to bring scholars with different 
backgrounds together in new joint ventures.4 This is clearly also one of the 
main benefits of this particular book, where scholars with various backgrounds 
use “the history of knowledge” as a common denominator for discussing 1960s 
and 1970s Scandinavia.
The focus on materiality also links the history of knowledge to the bour-
geoning field of digital humanities, as exemplified by the extensive use of digi-
talised newspapers in several chapters in this book. In his reflective chapter, 
David Heidenblad Larsson discusses the challenges for historians faced with an 
abundance of source material in which it is easy to identify solitary examples 
but where both the larger context and the immediate situation in which the 
text was published tend to become more difficult to comprehend: it is easy to 
find needles but difficult to see the haystack. This is something I can recognise 
from the field of conceptual history, where the rise of digital tools has coin-
cided with a turn away from the Skinnerian focus on actors making linguistic 
moves (speech acts) in particular contexts and a return of a more traditional 
Koselleckian interest in the long-term trajectories (and frequencies) of the 
concepts themselves.5 Old-school intellectual historians such as Marchand and 
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myself, who are more interested in the “who” and the “why” than the “how” 
and the “what”, cannot help but look at this development with slight umbrage.6
At the same time, however, Larsson Heidenblad aptly argues that digital 
humanities can serve the positive purpose of broadening the scope of studied 
actors from leading politicians, intellectuals, and authors to previously largely 
ignored groups of people such as journalists, who, after all, produced the lion’s 
share of the written text consumed by Scandinavians in the 1960s and 1970s. 
What this turn requires, however, is a closer cooperation with press historians 
and media scholars. As noted by Sunniva Engh in her chapter on Norwegian 
newspaper discussions on the Swedish neo-Malthusian Georg Borgström, this 
was a period of transition for the Nordic newspaper industry. The traditional 
politicised party press system was gradually abandoned for more neutral and 
professionalised forms of journalism.7 This is certainly a valid point. However, 
when studying the latter half of the 20th century, it would also be crucial to 
pursue cooperation with scholars with expertise in radio and TV, as especially 
the latter grew enormously in importance during the 1960s and 1970s.8 Non-
textual sources (such as images, public speeches, official meetings, private dis-
cussions, etc.) have always represented something of a blind spot for intellectual 
historians and historians of knowledge alike.9 However, if the aim is to give a 
fair image of broader forms of societal knowledge, the fact that mass communi-
cation during the 20th century to a significant degree occurred without leaving 
records in the form of letters printed on paper constitutes an even more serious 
methodological challenge. Until we find a way of treating broadcasting on an 
equal level as traditional text-based sources, the digital turn runs the risk of only 
increasing the already distorted account we historians present of the circulation 
of knowledge during the postwar period.
Scandinavia in the global circulation of knowledge
History of knowledge, we learn from the introduction, focuses on the circulation 
rather than the origin of knowledge. In this sense, it contributes to the extensive 
discussion on transnationalism that has reconditioned the historical disciplines 
during the past decades.10 In intellectual history, for example, much attention 
has been placed on the processes of selective interpretation and appropriation 
that inevitably take place when an idea is moved from one place to another.11 
Knowledge does not travel in sealed containers; it is constantly moulded in 
order to serve particular purposes in the new contexts in which it is introduced.
What do we learn from this book about Scandinavia’s position in the global 
circulation of knowledge? A first observation in this respect is that Scandinavia 
appears to be more on the receiving than the sending end. Most of the chapters 
address the Scandinavian reception of a book or some other body of knowledge 
and discuss the special interpretations and functions assigned to this knowledge 
in its new context. To be sure, it is possible that the dominance of reception 
stories is a consequence of the methodological preferences of the history of 
knowledge. If the ambition is to study the circulation of knowledge in society 
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beyond political and scholarly elites, it is perhaps only natural to concentrate on 
how imported knowledge has been disseminated in Scandinavia, rather than on 
how knowledge originating in Scandinavia has travelled elsewhere.
That said, I sincerely think that it could be an interesting task for future 
research to target failed and more successful attempts to export “Scandinavian 
knowledge” to different parts of the world. This would probably increase the 
span of collaboration of historians of knowledge even further, as such a task 
would preferably have to be initiated in cooperation with foreign scholars. Pur-
suing Scandinavian knowledge export, the history of knowledge could yield 
an important contribution to, for example, research on the global reach of the 
Nordic welfare model, the discussion on policy transfers, as well as the bour-
geoning field of Nordic branding and national reputation management.12 The 
1960s and 1970s were also decades of growing Scandinavian engagement in the 
global south, which, in all its Cold War and colonial complexity, could be an 
interesting field to approach from a history of knowledge perspective.13
A second observation regarding Scandinavia’s position in the global circu-
lation of knowledge in the 1960s and 1970s pertains to the overwhelming 
predominance of knowledge imported from the United States. The Scandina-
vian countries, neutral or not, were obviously heavily Americanised during the 
decades following the Second World War, and the importance of American 
ideas, expertise, and funding for the development of both the welfare state and 
scholarly communities has been studied extensively.14 This book can be seen 
as a contribution to this literature, expanding the focus beyond the political 
or scientific elites to a discussion of the broader societal impact of American 
knowledge, ranging from Caspar Sylvest’s chapter on how American debates 
on the dangers of nuclear fallout resonated in a Danish context to Anton Jans-
son’s chapter on the Swedish reception of the book The Secular City (1965), by 
American theologian Harvey Cox.
This palpable Scandinavian dependence on American knowledge could 
form the point of departure for interesting theoretical reflections regarding 
geo-cultural asymmetries and power relations within the field of history of 
knowledge.15 To be sure, I am not advocating a return to the antiquated diffu-
sionist idea of simple one-way traffic from a producer of knowledge to passive 
recipients. As shown by Jansson, Cox’s book was interpreted quite differently 
in Sweden, where, for example, the chapter on sex did not raise anyone’s eye-
brows. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that some regions are more frequently at 
the receiving end than others and that this is a fact that deserves to be taken 
more seriously from a theoretical and methodological perspective. Indeed, even 
if focusing on “circulation” is supposed to underscore that knowledge does not 
travel without restrictions, I cannot help being slightly concerned that the cir-
culation concept itself – in its allusion to reciprocity and restriction-free travel – 
might serve the opposite purpose of obscuring hierarchies between actors of 
different stature and reputation or between societies and cultures asymmetri-
cally related to each other.16
Questions of power and hierarchy have been pertinently addressed in the 
literature on the circulation of ideas, science, and knowledge in the global 
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south, and as such it has been deeply informed by postcolonial perspectives.17 
There is undoubtedly much that has been produced in this tradition that 
could be used to shed light on small European countries such as those in 
Scandinavia as well. I am thinking, for example, of the relationship between 
military and economic power, on the one hand, and cultural prestige, on the 
other. But I am also referring to the intricate logic of asymmetrical knowl-
edge transfers, where ideas produced in the United States or Western Europe 
were more easily recognised as knowledge in Scandinavia than the other way 
around. Indeed, when Cox’s book on secularisation was introduced in Swe-
den, its American origin served as an important selling point. Scandinavian 
discussions, by contrast, were usually ignored in the United States, and there 
were a number of serious obstacles to overcome before Scandinavian actors, 
ideas, or knowledge could make a mark in the United States. And before 
Scandinavian knowledge could circulate to other peripheries, it had to be 
picked up and “consecrated” in the centre.18
That said, there are certainly limitations to the applicability of theories address-
ing the inequalities of colonial, imperial, or racial dominance on intra-European 
relations. The position of Scandinavia has never been that of the complete out-
sider, as Scandinavian actors were recognised and sometimes even allowed to 
take part in the “universal” discussion of the West. And American (or “West-
ern”) knowledge was hardly ever used in order to exploit and subjugate Scandi-
navia. Nonetheless, as shown by numerous examples in the book, it was usually a 
matter of one-way traffic from a cultural centre to a periphery keen on learning 
about the latest trends.
Scandinavia as a public sphere
What do we learn from the book about the relations between the Scandina-
vian countries? To treat the three Scandinavian countries together in a col-
lective volume on the history of knowledge in the 1960s and 1970s seems 
natural given not only the many similarities between the societies in question, 
but also the many links between the countries. Most notably, perhaps, Eirinn 
Larsen shows how Nordic cooperation as such was of formative significance 
for the development of the feminist movement. Some chapters study intra- 
Scandinavian knowledge transfers, while others have a comparative ambition. 
And even if the majority of chapters are written mainly from a national perspec-
tive, the book does collectively present us with an interesting material for reflect-
ing over the similarities and differences between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
In relation to this, it is also interesting to pay attention to intra-Scandinavian 
hierarchies and asymmetries. The chapters that discuss the internal Scandina-
vian circulation of knowledge strongly indicate that Norwegian and Danish 
actors looked more to Sweden in search for knowledge than Swedes looked 
to its Scandinavian neighbours. From Sunniva Engh’s chapter, for example, 
we learn that the Swedish environmentalist Georg Borgström became enor-
mously important in Norway, while the Danish debate book Oprør fra midten 
(1978), according to Bo Fritzbøger, was discussed in Norway but did not travel 
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to any large extent to Sweden, even if the questions and perspectives it raised 
could have been very topical also in that context.
To be sure, following the Second World War, Sweden was more prosper-
ous than its neighbours, which arguably resulted in a certain pre-eminence also 
in the cultural and scientific spheres. Precisely as is often the case with global 
asymmetries, however, it seems to me that the conundrum of Swedish cultural 
dominance in the region as well as Swedish self-sufficiency is best understood in 
temporal terms.19 In such a reading, Norway could be understood as the laggard, 
which either due to a conservative ideology or because of late modernisation 
looked at developments elsewhere – in Sweden or the Anglo-American world – 
as possible futures upon which one could act with anticipation.20 Denmark 
appears as the country most in sync with discussions in Europe or the United 
States, not as an equal participant in the discussion but as an observer eagerly 
picking up on knowledge that was circulating elsewhere. Sweden, in turn, stands 
out as a country that was simultaneously a Scandinavian locomotive of modernity 
and a peculiar parochial milieu largely disinterested in discussions in the other 
Scandinavian countries, or indeed anywhere else except for the United States.
Particularly illuminating in this respect is Björn Lundberg’s account of the 
circulation of the famous book by American economist John Kenneth Gal-
braith, The Affluent Society (1958). In Sweden, Galbraith’s concerns with the dis-
crepancy between private and public wealth in modern growth societies were 
received as a description of pertinent problems in the United States, which were 
already largely solved in Sweden. In Denmark, by contrast, Galbraith was seen 
as representing an important discussion on challenges common to all West-
ern societies, while in Norway, the book was seen as a warning for challenges 
that might arise in due time when Norway would “catch up” with the indus-
trial and economic development of the United States and become an afflu-
ent society. The Scandinavian societies were moving at different speeds.21 And, 
interestingly, this asynchronicity could sometimes be mobilised for particular 
purposes, as illustrated by Hampus Östh Gustafsson’s chapter on the “the crisis 
of humanities” in Sweden. Sometimes the crisis was presented as a common 
problem for all Western welfare states, occasionally as something particular to 
the Scandinavian region, but ever so often also as a specifically Swedish problem 
in narratives where Denmark could sometimes play the role of the “civilised” 
sibling society where modernisation had not yet reached as far as in Sweden. 
In this way, Gustafsson’s discussion on the crisis of the humanities also speaks to 
an interesting combination of progressivity and backward-looking conservative 
sentimentality, perhaps characteristic of the 1968 movement as a whole.
A Scandinavian model of knowledge?
Power is a central notion in the methodological literature on the history of 
knowledge. In turning the attention away from the traditional obsession with 
the “origins” of knowledge and the one-dimensional diffusionist models of dis-
semination, the history of knowledge has, most notably in the programmatic 
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writings of Philipp Sarasin, emphasised the importance of taking into account 
the various social and economic factors that constrain and determine both 
what is sanctioned as knowledge and how this knowledge circulates.22
These kinds of reflections are, with a few exceptions, conspicuously absent 
from this book on Scandinavia in the 1960s and 1970s. It would perhaps be 
compelling to explain this by reference to the comparatively homogeneous 
and egalitarian nature of the Scandinavian societies during the heyday of the 
Nordic welfare state. While there certainly might be some truth to this cliché, 
there could have been many obvious entry points for a history of knowledge 
perspective on the relationship between power and knowledge in the Scan-
dinavian welfare state. I am naturally referring to the extensive (and largely 
Foucauldian) literature from the past decades, that has criticised the welfare 
state by highlighting its maltreatment of vulnerable minorities and individuals, 
as well as different oppressive policies (e.g., forced sterilisations) implemented 
and justified in the name of progress, science, and knowledge.23 In my opin-
ion, this literature has often tended to either lose itself in vague and abstract 
speculations on regulatory mechanisms and biopower or single out individual 
scientists, experts, or politicians as villains. Therefore, it would have been very 
interesting to see what a history of knowledge perspective could contribute to 
this discussion. There are many unanswered questions that could form the start-
ing point for future research. For example: How widely did the “knowledge” 
that motivated these policies (e.g. on sterilisation) circulate in Scandinavia? And 
what kind of “knowledge” contributed to their demise?
To the extent that the individual chapters in this book address questions of 
power, it is not so much about the uses and misuses of knowledge, the dark 
sides of social engineering, or the tyranny of experts. Instead, the chapters tend 
to focus on the struggles of different actors to get a particular body of ideas 
sanctioned as knowledge. Take Orsi Husz’s fascinating account of how a Swedish 
entrepreneur became fixated with the idea to consolidate a particular narrative 
regarding the history of credit but failed to convince the professionals within 
academia and publishing, or Hampus Östh Gustafsson’s chapter on the strug-
gles of Sven-Eric Liedman and his cohorts to rehabilitate the humanities after a 
long period of dominance by more instrumental empiricist-positivist sciences. 
Particularly fascinating is Kari Hernæs Nordberg’s chapter on the mid-1970s 
sex education reforms in Norwegian public schools, which explicitly targets 
the complicated negotiations between various bodies of knowledge that inevi-
tably take place whenever new knowledge is introduced on a larger scale but 
which are especially manifest when it comes to the delicate issue of reproduc-
tion and sex. Hernæs Nordberg describes how new psychological and statistical 
knowledge was compromised by traditional conservative Christian knowledge 
before it was sanctioned by the state (i.e., the Ministry of Education) and intro-
duced in the curriculum of public schools.
To be sure, in the Nordic countries, the state has traditionally played a crucial 
role as both producer and circulator of knowledge as well as guardian and judge 
of knowledge, perhaps especially during the period targeted by this volume. 
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The strong connection between the leading national universities and the state 
has been emphasised by historians across the region, and the role of experts in 
forming the welfare state has also been studied extensively.24 However, what 
emerges from the broader history of knowledge perspective applied in this 
book is not so much an image of an omnipotent state on its own capable of 
dictating what could count as knowledge or not. Instead, the chapters tend to 
point in the direction of an intricate corporatist model of knowledge, where 
science and experts, on the one hand, and social movements and voluntary 
associations, on the other, were engaged in constant negotiations with state 
representatives. These different sectors of society typically did not represent 
adverse or competing interests; on the contrary, they supported each other and 
became allies, with their activities intertwining to such a degree that it was 
sometimes difficult to discern the boundaries of the state. Indeed, as Hernæs 
Nordberg notes, “it is not always clear what the state represents or constitutes”.
The idea that education and knowledge are crucial ingredients of the good 
society and that they should thus be made available for everyone has arguably 
been a crucial part Nordic political thinking since, if not the Reformation and 
its emphasis on public literacy, then at least the 19th-century folk high school 
(folkehøjskoler) tradition mainly associated with Danish pastor and educationalist 
N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783–1872). Education and knowledge were pivotal also for 
voluntary associations and social movements in the Nordic countries. Whether 
it was a rifle club, a temperance movement, or a labour organisation, these asso-
ciations usually, as pointed out by the Finnish historian Henrik Stenius, enter-
tained ambitious cultural objectives in the form of libraries, lecture series, and 
various publications.25 Crucially, however, this knowledge was not produced 
and disseminated in order to overthrow the state or to present people with 
alternatives to state-sanctioned knowledge. On the contrary, the ambition was 
to influence the state and to contribute to the progress of society as a whole. 
The reformers and “activists” of these movements did not regard their position 
as outside of the state but as one intrinsic to it and thus taking shared responsi-
bility for its development. “State” and “society” were not different spheres, but 
two aspects of the same thing.26
This historical legacy formed a crucial background for the social democratic 
model of society that made Scandinavia famous in the 20th century. The role of 
the state had been substantial in the Nordic societies ever since the Church was 
incorporated into the state administration with the Reformation, but the 20th 
century saw its role increase even further. “State-sanctioned” knowledge was 
produced increasingly in public reports (Statens offentliga utredningar) commis-
sioned by the state but conducted by independent scholars and experts. And the 
interplay between civil society actors and the state grew closer as the state often 
trusted organisations with the task of providing expert knowledge and popular 
opinion in support of its decisions (remissväsendet). Indeed, the social democratic 
welfare state deemed this corporatist system so central that it took increasing 
responsibility for funding the operation of (at least some particularly impor-
tant) voluntary organisations, sometimes through direct institutionalisation but 
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more frequently respecting the arm’s-length principle and a general division of 
labour.27
This book is abundant with examples of this corporatist model of knowl-
edge. The whole first part of the book serves as evidence of how the Scandina-
vian environmental movement engaged scholars and experts who founded and 
used voluntary organisations as a platform for increasing their influence. Expert 
knowledge was, for example, channelled to the state through the peace move-
ment in Casper Sylvest’s chapter on the debates on nuclear fallout. Similarly, 
Eirinn Larsen points to the crucial role of feminist scholars in the energetic and 
innovative popular women’s movements that conquered the state, introducing 
what was later to be referred to as Scandinavian state feminism. Indeed, even 
programmatically “oppositional” movements such as the left-wing book cafes 
analysed by Ragni Svensson were incorporated as conductive elements of the 
democratic society. In this way, the “corporatist model of knowledge” must be 
seen as a crucial part of the explanation for how the 1968 movement was, as 
noted in the introduction to this book, disarmed, embraced, and integrated as 
part of a continuous development of the Scandinavian welfare societies.28
A knowledge regime under attack?
If the Scandinavian corporatist model of knowledge emerges as a key finding of 
this book, the next question is whether this model was particular to the period 
under study or whether it exhibits longevity as a description of the Nordic 
societies. The 1960s and 1970s are often pinpointed as the high point of the 
social democratic dominance in Scandinavian politics. One way of thinking 
about this period from a history of knowledge perspective is to use the concept 
of a “knowledge regime” operationalised by Norwegian sociologist, philoso-
pher, and intellectual historian Rune Slagstad in his seminal account of Norwe-
gian history since 1814, De nasjonale strateger (1998).29 For Slagstad, a knowledge 
regime is a particular constellation of political power, legal normativity, and 
scientific knowledge, and his book describes the shifting regimes from the “civil 
servant’s state” (1814–1884), through the “Liberal Party state” (1884–1940) to 
the “Labour Party state” of the postwar period.
According to Slagstad, this last knowledge regime was characterised by a 
mutually reinforcing circle of Keynesian economists, American empiricist and 
behaviourist social scientists (pejoratively labelled “positivists”), and the social 
democratic politicians in power. However, while there are some examples in this 
direction in this book, it seems to me that it portrays less the Labour Party State 
itself (which, according to Slagstad, lasted until the 1980s) than the emerging 
contestation of this regime from a variety of angles. Hampus Östh Gustafsson’s 
chapter deals explicitly with the so-called positivism debates where the domi-
nant role of the instrumental social sciences was questioned in a generational 
struggle between old professors and young radicals rallying for the restoration 
of the humanities. Ragni Svensson’s chapter highlights the left-wing criticism 
of the (social democratic) establishment, while Bo Fritzbøger’s chapter, in turn, 
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deals with the “revolt from the centre” (Oprør fra midten), which was a counter-
reaction to the radicalism of the 1970s, but also an independent attempt to 
provide an alternative to the disenchantment of the modern welfare state.
Most obviously, however, the contestation of the Labour Party knowledge 
regime is discussed in Niklas Olsen’s fascinating account of the interconnec-
tions between left-wing, libertarian-populist, and neoliberal criticisms of the 
welfare state: three disparate lines of thought, which were united in the view 
that society – the Labour Party State – was run by a self-sufficient autocratic 
elite in control of an ever-growing public sector with tentacles across society. In 
hindsight, it is probably fair to conclude that the neoliberal criticism proved to 
be the most perilous. As hinted already by Slagstad himself, market liberalism 
attacked the very idea of the state as a central node in the corporatist system; 
hence, it challenged not only the Labour Party knowledge regime but a whole 
Scandinavian tradition: the corporatist model of knowledge.30 Neoliberalism 
was extremely difficult to embrace, disarm, and incorporate within the system 
itself in the vein that the Nordic societies usually have managed opposition like, 
for example, the 1968 movement.
Yet, historians seem to indicate that neoliberalism was introduced in Scandi-
navia not against the (welfare) state but through the (welfare) state.31 If this is true, 
then one might perhaps argue that Scandinavia eventually did find a place for 
neoliberal market philosophy in its state-driven corporatist model of knowl-
edge. At the same time, Scandinavian scholars of associational life have recently 
pointed to a transforming civil society, with declining membership rates in the 
traditional mass movements and the rise of more flexible and ad hoc mobili-
sation, amounting in “a decline in the democratic infrastructure”.32 What is 
challenged, they argue, is not so much the role of the state in Scandinavia but 
rather the role of the voluntary organisations. Indeed, knowledge in Scandina-
via is perhaps no longer negotiated in a virtuous circle of experts, the state, and 
voluntary organisations but to an increasing extent produced and circulated by 
think tanks with more direct relations to political power and business interest.
The history of the Nordic “neoliberal knowledge regime” remains to be 
written, but this book offers a great springboard. On the one hand, it has 
opened up for further reflections regarding Scandinavia’s position in the global 
circulation of knowledge, and, on the other hand, it has also pointed towards a 
Scandinavian corporatist model of knowledge and its subsequent contestation.
Notes
 1 I follow the rest of the book in using “Scandinavia” for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
and “the Nordic countries” when I include Finland and Iceland. The Scandinavian term 
Norden (literally “the North”) has been introduced to the English language in order 
to denote the particular political culture and historical legacies of the region. See, for 
instance, Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth, eds., The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: 
Scandinavian University Press, 1997).
 2 Philipp Sarasin, “Was ist Wissensgeschichte?”, Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der 
deutschen Literatur 36, no. 1 (2011): 165; Simone Lässig, “The History of Knowledge and 
Scandinavia 255
the Expansion of the Historical Research Agenda”, Bulletin of the German Historical Insti-
tute 59 (2016): 39; Peter Burke, What Is the History of Knowledge? (London: John Wiley 
and Sons, 2015), 7.
 3 In my own research, for example, I have arrived at the position that it is better to avoid 
categorical statements regarding influence and instead focus on the individual intel-
lectuals as actors, whose struggles reflect ideas and positions present in that particular 
context. See, for instance, Johan Strang, History, Transfer, Politics: Five Studies on the Legacy 
of Uppsala Philosophy (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2010).
 4 Suzanne Marchand, “How Much Knowledge Is Worth Knowing? An American Intel-
lectual Historian’s Thoughts on the Geschichte des Wissens”, Berichte zur Wissenschaftsge-
schichte 42, no. 2–3 (2019): 147.
 5 This shift is clearly visible in the introduction to the recent Berghahn series on European 
conceptual history. Willibald Steinmetz and Michael Freeden, “Introduction. Concep-
tual History: Challenges, Conundrums, Complexities”, in Conceptual History in the Euro-
pean Space, eds. Willibald Steinmetz, Michael Freeden, and Javier Fernández-Sebastian 
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2017).
 6 Marchand, “How Much Knowledge”, 144.
 7 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Manchini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 170–183.
 8 Trine Syvertsen, Gunn Enli, and Ole J. Mjøs, The Media Welfare State: Nordic Media in the 
Digital Era (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2014).
 9 For a discussion on historicising sound, see Josephine Hoegarts and Kaarina Kilpiö, 
“Noisy Modernization? On the History and Historicization of Sound”, International 
Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 7 (2019).
 10 Matthias Middell and Lluís Roura, eds., Transnational Challenges to National History 
Writing (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013); Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, 
“Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity”, History and 
Theory 45, no. 1 (2006).
 11 Christophe Charle, Jürgen Schriewer, and Peter Wagner, Transnational Intellectual 
Networks: Forms of Academic Knowledge and the Search for Cultural Identities (Frankfurt: 
Campus Verlag, 2004); Franco Moretti, Distant Reading (London: Verso, 2013); Samuel 
Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014).
 12 Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen, Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Histori-
cal Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011); Carl Marklund, “The 
Nordic Model on the Global Market of Ideas: The Welfare State as Scandinavia’s Best 
Brand”, Geopolitics 22, no. 3 (2016); Louis Clerc, Nikolas Glover, and Paul Jordan, eds., 
Histories of Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding in the Nordic and Baltic Countries: Repre-
senting the Periphery (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
 13 Thorsten Borring Olesen, “Scandinavian Development Policies”, in The Routledge 
Handbook of Scandinavian Politics, eds. Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (London: 
Routledge, 2018).
 14 See, for instance, Klaus Petersen, John Stewart, and Michael Kuur Sørensen, eds., Amer-
ican Foundations and the European Welfare States (Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag, 
2013); Frederik Thue, In Quest of a Democratic Social Order: The Americanization of Norwe-
gian Social Scholarship 1918–1970 (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2006).
 15 Together with Stefan Nygård, I have pursued this idea with regard to intellectual his-
tory in a number of publications. See especially Marja Jalava, Stefan Nygård, and Johan 
Strang, Decentering European Intellectual Space (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
 16 Provocatively put, my impression is that “circulation” is a term that is used either by 
those in the centres who by virtue of their privileged position are blind to borders and 
restrictions or by postcolonialists who for political reasons want to emphasise reciprocity.
 17 Kapril Raj, “Beyond Postcolonialism . . . and Postpositivism: Circulation and the Global 
History of Science”, Isis 104, no. 2 (2013); Bernard Lightman, Gordon McOuat, and 
256 Johan Strang
Larry Stewart, eds., The Circulation of Knowledge Between Britain, India, and China: The 
Early Modern World to the Twentieth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
 18 Pascal Casanova, The World Republic of Letters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
 19 I have developed this idea together with Stefan Nygård in “Conceptual Universalization 
and the Role of the Peripheries”, Contributions to the History of Concepts 12, no. 1 (2017).
 20 For a discussion on Finland’s similar relation to Sweden, see Pauli Kettunen, “The Power 
of International Comparison: A Perspective on the Making and Challenging of the 
Nordic Welfare State”, in The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal, eds. Niels 
Finn Christiansen, Klaus Petersen, Nils Edling, and Per Haave (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanu Press, 2006).
 21 Helge Jordheim, “Europe at Different Speeds: Asynchronicities and Multiple Times in 
European Conceptual History”, in Conceptual History in European Space, eds. Willibald 
Steinmetz, Michael Freeden, and Javier Fernández-Sebastian (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017).
 22 Sarasin, “Was ist Wissensgeschichte?” 164.
 23 Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, Eugenics and the Welfare State: Norway, Sweden, Den-
mark, and Finland (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2005); Gunnar Broberg 
and Mattias Tydén, Oönskade i folkhemmet: Rashygien och sterilisering i Sverige (Stockholm: 
Gidlunds bokförlag, 1991).
 24 Åsa Lundqvist and Klaus Petersen, eds., In Experts We Trust: Knowledge, Politics and 
Bureaucracy in Nordic Welfare State (Odense: University of Southern Denmark Press, 2010).
 25 Henrik Stenius, “Nordic Associational Life in a European and an Inter-Nordic Per-
spective”, in Nordic Associations in a European Perspective, eds. Risto Alapuro and Henrik 
Stenius (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010).
 26 It is often observed that the words “state” and “society” tend to be used interchangeably 
in the Nordic languages. According to Pauli Kettunen, for example, “society” is often 
used to express the moral obligation of the state. Pauli Kettunen, “The Concept of 
Society in the Making of the Nordic Welfare State”, in Globalizing Welfare: An Evolv-
ing Asian-European Dialogue, eds. Stein Kuhnle, Per Selle and Sven Hort (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2019).
 27 Bo Rothstein, Den korporativa staten: Intresseorganisationer och statsförvaltning i svensk politik 
(Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992).
 28 Stenius, “Nordic Associational Life”; Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, Transformation and Crises: 
The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Sweden, 1956–1980 (New York: Berghahn, 2008).
 29 Rune Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1998). For a short English version 
of his main arguments, see Rune Slagstad, “Shifting Knowledge Regimes: The Meta-
morphoses of Norwegian Reformism”, Thesis Eleven 77 (2004).
 30 Slagstad, “Shifting Knowledge Regimes”, 80; Stenius, “Nordic Associational Life”.
 31 Jenny Andersson, The Library and the Workshop: Social Democracy and Capitalism in the 
Knowledge Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Niklas Olsen, The Sovereign 
Consumer: A New Intellectual History of Neoliberalism (Cham: Palgrave, 2019), Chapters 
6–7. 
 32 See, for instance, Tommy Tranvik and Per Selle, “More Centralization, Less Democracy: 
The Decline of the Democratic Infrastructure in Norway”, in State and Civil Society in North-
ern Europe: The Swedish Model Reconsidered, ed. Lars Trägårdh (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007).
